Know when to fold 'em: how the corporate bankruptcy system benefits and hinders the economy by Stephen Slivinski
hen Richmond-based Circuit City — the second-largest consumer electronics
retailer in the nation — declared bankruptcy on Nov. 10, 2008, the company still
had some options to keep itself alive. Although the withdrawal of the $1 billion bid for 
the company by Blockbuster Inc. in July must have been fresh in the minds of the firm’s 
managers, they declared in the bankruptcy filing their intent to emerge from the court 









On paper, the immediate problem that afflicted the
company was the massive amount of debt it had accumu-
lated to sustain its operations in the face of slow sales. The
managers were hopeful that the company could be valuable
to a new owner and scrambled to cobble together a deal
with some interested buyers, and the judge in the case set
a January date to auction off the firm. 
On the morning of January 16, the company’s creditors
and nearly 34,000 employees found out the end had
arrived. That’s when Judge Kevin Huennekens agreed to
Circuit City’s request to close its doors for good and liqui-
date its inventory. 
The firm’s demise might not have been much of a sur-
prise to the creditors and vendors who supplied Circuit
City’s inventory in those dying days. Fearing poor sales at
the store’s locations in the 2008 holiday shopping season,
vendors began to restrict the flow of merchandise as early
as November. The creditors of the company, led by Bank 
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of America, told the firm’s managers they simply could 
not provide funding to keep the 500-plus locations in
operation. Market players seemed to be saying what
Circuit City’s corporate heads feared: The company was no
longer economically viable, unable to compete in a world
full of popular online retailers and other low-cost shopping
options.
In all bankruptcy proceedings, the most important
question is whether a particular company has simply fallen
on hard times or whether it’s not economically viable any-
more, such as a typewriter manufacturer in a world where
typing has migrated almost universally to computer key-
boards. For many businesses, the day may come when the
question their managers have to answer becomes one
familiar to poker players: When do you fold? Not to grap-
ple with such a question could cause a variety of firms that
should whither away to survive instead, and vice versa.
Either outcome would be bad for economic growth. 
The institutions in the United States that have been
created to officiate the process are the bankruptcy courts.
Of course, simply declaring bankruptcy doesn’t automati-
cally imply that a company is doomed. The system has two
tiers. The form of bankruptcy that Circuit City entered —
called “Chapter 11” after the title of the section of the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code that created it — was originally
designed to create a means by which firms could reorgan-
ize themselves and survive by renegotiating costly
contracts or restructuring their debt obligations. That’s a
distinctly different approach than that taken in Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code in which a company is liquidated.
As in the case of Circuit City, liquidation can be the out-
come of a Chapter 11 proceeding that does not result in a
reorganization or sale of the firm.
There are many companies battered by bad economic
times that can still survive if they just have a safe harbor in
the storm. Reorganization in Chapter 11 gives them such
an option, and it’s an important one. But if a company is
likely to be liquidated anyway because it simply isn’t able to
survive in a modern marketplace, why would it go through
the hassle and cost of trying to reorganize? And since
bankruptcy proceedings ask a single judge to be the arbiter
of whether a firm is viable as an economic entity, it’s also a
concern to some that current bankruptcy practice assumes
one person with incomplete knowledge will be able to
accurately predict the future contours of the U.S. economy.
Firms that probably shouldn’t be reorganized might be
able to survive for a bit longer if they find a sufficiently
sympathetic judge, and that creates economic inefficiency.
“There is an opportunity cost to keeping a nonviable firm
alive for too long,” says Todd Zywicki, a professor at
George Mason University Law School.  For instance, econ-
omists Ricardo Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, and Anil Kashyap
have argued that subsidies to money-losing “zombie” firms
have helped keep those businesses afloat, while depressing
the creation of new competitors.
These concerns have sparked a debate within academic,
legal, and economic circles about how bankruptcy func-
tions in the United States. In the view of some, the current
system could lead to adverse consequences alongside its
benefits. 
Railroads and the Logic of Bankruptcy 
You can’t understand modern bankruptcy law without
knowing the story of the 19th century U.S. railroad indus-
try. “If you talk to most legal scholars about Chapter 11,
they usually bring up the railroads as the poster children
for why we need a law of corporate reorganization,” says
Douglas Baird of the University of Chicago Law School.
After the Civil War, the American economy became
increasingly national in scope thanks in part to the evolu-
tion of rail travel. The number of miles of train track more
than tripled between 1870 and 1900, allowing the expand-
ed movement of goods and eventually an increase in the
number of newly industrialized manufacturing centers. 
In fact, the railroad companies would become the first
modern corporations in U.S. history. Before 1860, the rail-
roads were financed mainly by the farmers and merchants
who benefited from the lines. After 1860, however, railroad
companies had to seek capital from New York financial
houses. This effectively made them a trans-state operation
in terms of capital structure as well as in the services they
provided. 
Between 1865 and 1890, railroad competition intensi-
fied. Cartels formed and collapsed. Then the early 1890s
witnessed one of the United States’ worst economic down-
turns at the time. By the mid-1890s, many railroad
companies were unable to make the payments on their
bonds, leading judges to reckon with how to deal with
high-cost operations that had numerous investors.
The approach the courts took was a reorganization of
the companies. The goal was to rearrange the capital 
structure and allow a firm to provide ongoing value to
creditors beyond the temporary economic tumult. The
only other alternatives would have been to sell the firm to
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up the railroad tracks, melt them, and sell them for scrap.
The second option would have destroyed a tremendous
amount of economic value. The railroad companies were
surely still more valuable than the sum of their parts.
But capital markets were relatively undeveloped at the
time and that made it very difficult to engineer a sale at a
price acceptable to both parties. So the simplest way to
save the company was to reorganize it and allow the rail-
road, as the legal scholars say, to retain the value it had as a
“going concern.”    
Also, there was the sticky matter of the type and num-
ber of creditors. “One of the reasons that it was compelling
to reorganize the railroad companies is because they had
massively chaotic capital structures,” says Baird. “The
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, for
instance, issued over 40 different types of bonds held by
thousands of bondholders all over the universe.” 
The disparate nature of this large group of creditors
meant they would not have been able to collaborate 
and agree on whether to sell the company or how to
restructure it. The transaction costs of working out a reor-
ganization agreement would have been very high. “One 
of the main reasons to have a collective procedure 
is that the creditors can’t work together outside of bank-
ruptcy,” explains Baird. 
That alone seems like a big enough problem. But imag-
ine what might happen if a group of creditors decides they
don’t want to restructure and rush to stake their claim to
the railroads assets? That could set off a rush to disinvest
in the company, throwing it further into financial straits
and leaving those who are late to the feeding frenzy with-
out much to show for it. A system of bankruptcy that
provides a “safe harbor” for firms is important in such an
environment.
So it should be no surprise that the railroad example is
one of the most common historical examples in the litera-
ture on bankruptcy law. But there’s a catch, argues Baird:
It’s really hard to argue that the logic of the example
applies to the modern world. “The traditional justification
for reorganization is that the firm cannot be sold as a going
concern, there’s a lot of firm-specific value at risk, and the
creditors cannot cooperate outside of bankruptcy.
Reorganization can only be justified if all three of those 
are true at the same time. Today, in many cases, they  are
not all true.”
Baird suggests that most firms today don’t own special-
ized assets that are only valuable in their current
firm-specific context. Most companies own or lease assets,
like machinery — or, in the Circuit City example, retail
space — that would indeed have valuable alternative uses
to another firm. In fact, much of the value of many modern
firms is portable: It consists of the human capital of the
employees. 
Business success instead rests largely on the originality
of a company’s approach. “Today, bankruptcy law can
affect your capital structure, but it can’t make you success-
ful in the marketplace. That depends on your business
model,” explains Robert Rasmussen, dean of USC Gould
School of Law. 
The specter of the collective action problem has been
lessened in the modern world too. It’s rarely the case that
a single firm has a large number of creditors. “If you look at
many firms filing for bankruptcy today, there is often one
creditor that has a revolving credit line and that person or
firm is basically making many of the important decisions.
There’s no coordination problem there,” says Baird. In
fact, many corporations have been able to renegotiate
their debt contracts outside of court and never have to
declare bankruptcy. 
The Rules and Costs of the Bankruptcy Game
Even if the traditional railroad paradigm were applicable
today, the bankruptcy proceeding may still have shortcom-
ings as a result of its structure. Like any legal proceeding,
the bankruptcy process has its own unique set of rules 
and players. 
As Zywicki notes, the players with the most power in
the bankruptcy process are the firm’s managers. While
creditors can force a company into a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, those cases tend to be rare. Instead, it’s usually the
firm’s managers that are in the driver’s seat. “They control
when the bankruptcy is going to happen and they control
where the bankruptcy will be declared,” Zywicki says.
Because current law doesn’t require companies to declare
bankruptcy in the state where they are incorporated, man-
agers retain the ability to “forum shop” and scope out the
landscape for a friendly judge. 
Once a firm’s managers choose to declare bankruptcy,
they have a set period of time in which to present a reor-
ganization plan that must win the approval of the
creditors. If they don’t approve the plan or they can’t get a
buyer for the firm, then the company could head to liqui-
dation.
According to economist Michelle White of the
University of California at San Diego, these rules create
the wrong incentives and cost the economy in the process.
“In Chapter 11 there is a tendency for too many firms to be
saved,” she says.
The main reason is that the firm’s managers should be
expected to know more about the actual state of the firm
than the creditors or stockholders. If a firm is actually in
worse shape than the creditors realize, the managers have
an incentive to get them to agree to a reorganization plan
rather than liquidate the firm. Inability to do so might
result in those managers losing their jobs and equity in the
company. “It gives an incentive for bad firms to pretend
they’re good firms,” says White. “Those voting on the reor-
ganization plan may not know which type the firm is.”
If the current system leads to keeping alive too many
firms that should be liquidated, it could lead to capital
being trapped in a less-efficient use. This deadweight cost
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to the economy has been estimated by White as potential-
ly 20 times as big as the amount of money spent on direct
costs like lawyers’ fees.
The success rate of corporate reorganizations has come
into  question by other scholars. Finance professor Edith
Hotchkiss of Boston College found that one-third of the
firms that successfully restructured in Chapter 11 required
further restructuring in three years. “Her results are con-
sistent with a model in which some inefficient firms
reorganize even though they should liquidate,” points out
White in a 2005 working paper for the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
So, much of the debate over bankruptcy law really 
does come down to the effective use of information. The
ultimate decisions in a bankruptcy proceeding are made by
a single judge. But a single judge is unlikely to have all the
decentralized information that markets can summon, or
even know how to best utilize that information even if he
had it. 
“Bankruptcy puts the judge in a position to play central
planner,” says Zywicki. “The fundamental decision the
judge is making is whether the current deployment of
assets is more valuable than an alternative deployment of
assets in the economy.” By that standard, current bank-
ruptcy reorganization procedures may be suboptimal. 
Making Bankruptcy More Efficient
Each year, hundreds of thousands of firms fail. In fact,
most firms’ managers never see the inside of a bankruptcy
courtroom. According to the Small Business
Administration over 540,000 businesses fail each year. By
contrast, the number of firms that enter bankruptcy is
only a tenth of that. 
Those that do enter bankruptcy, however, are facing a
whole new set of realities. Baird argues that over time
Chapter 11 proceedings have become the most useful when
they serve as a controlled environment in which to con-
duct the speedy sale of a company, not to haggle over a
reorganization.
A similar approach to bankruptcy is one when Chapter
11 becomes merely a vehicle by which to auction off the
firm.  In this “mandatory auction” scenario, bidders —
some of whom could have better information than a typi-
cal bankruptcy judge or corporate debtor — would vie for
the ownership of the firm as a going concern. At that point,
the decision whether to liquidate or reorganize would be
made by the new owner.
In any case, the assumptions of corporate bankruptcy
laws would need to change. “In an ideal world, bankruptcy
law would aim to reduce the cost of capital,” says
Rasmussen. “You’d want to have a system that effectively
flushes the losers and salvages the winners. If you could do
that, it should lower the cost of capital because people
know the system won’t burn money trying to resurrect
companies that are not viable.” Making auctions the main
purpose of bankruptcy proceedings would do that. 
Rasmussen favors making the system even more decen-
tralized. He advocates what he calls a “menu approach” to
debtor-creditor contracts. If legal rules affect investment
decisions and the cost of capital, then uncertainty about
what might happen during a bankruptcy proceeding in the
future would have an influence on the risk premiums
charged by creditors today. So why not allow the rules to be
set by the companies themselves in their charters? 
“You can imagine a world where a company can agree at
the front end to limit its options if it falls into financial dis-
tress,” says Rasmussen. An example would be a debt
contract that gives the primary creditors more control
over business decisions in periods of economic distress or
other similar scenarios. Venture-capital investments are
often structured in this way. 
This option, however, is difficult to achieve in the cur-
rent bankruptcy regime. No company can legally bind
themselves never to resort to the bankruptcy courts. Still,
this hasn’t stopped many firms from finding some rather
sophisticated ways of contracting around this prohibition,
although the costs of doing so are quite high. Rasmussen’s
alternative would make reorganization within bankruptcy
courts one of many options, not the mandatory default.
How policymakers deal with the “creative destruction”
that leads economically unviable companies to fold 
and allows the resources to be reallocated by the market 
to something more useful is important. What mechanisms 
we use to assist that transition in an evolving modern 
economy are vital. Making sure those same mech-
anisms don’t hinder that process is potentially even more
crucial. So perhaps, as critics of the current bankruptcy
regime argue, it is about time we get more creative 
with our approach to the legal mechanisms of creative 
destruction. RF
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